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Civic Discourse Amid
Cultural Transformation
Calvin Massey
American civic and constitutional discourse reflects the culture of
which it is born. To talk about civic discourse is to talk about culture. And
since American culture seems to be perpetually in flux, the only fixed
aspect of American civic discourse may be its reflective relationship with
the culture.
We live in an age of cultural transformation. The industrial age has
finally surrendered to the information-based service economy. The era of
the printed word is edging into history, ever more rapidly replaced by
graphic imagery, whether the still photo, the staccato pulse of television,
or the interactive imagery of the Web. Popular culture - a localized cul-
ture of public participation, whether through town meetings, county
fairs, the community picnic on the Fourth of July, attending the high
school football game, or something else - has largely passed away,
replaced by a culture of mass entertainment - Disney World, MTV,
Hollywood productions, the Super Bowl, or anything skillfully packaged
for mass consumption. Authentic experience has begun to be replaced by
ersatz experience. No longer does one have to visit Paris or New York;
now Las Vegas will do almost as well. Who needs to visit Tierra del Fuego
to see penguins when their brightly defined and highly resolved images
cavort on large illuminated screens in your home?
These and other alterations of culture have produced, and will con-
tinue to produce, a distinct and discernible effect on civic discourse. In as
few words as possible I hope to outline some of the major cultural trans-
formations that recently have occurred or now are occurring, to relate
those events to discernible changes in the nature of civic discourse, and to
hazard some guesses about the future direction of our culture and our
public discourse.
L Cultural Transformation
The very idea of cultural transformation posits that the present cul-
ture is materially different from some past reference point. Of course, if
the cultural reference point is pushed far enough into the past, cultural
transformation will be virtually self-evident, and if yesterday is the refer-
ence, there will be no detectable difference, barring some sudden
intervening apocalypse such as collision with an asteroid. So what refer-
ence point should be used? Since my focus is upon the relationship
between culture and civic discourse, especially constitutional discourse,
one obvious candidate is 1787, another is 1868, and a third might be
1937.' I do not wish to load the dice in favor of my argument by focus-
ing exclusively on 1787, which is, after all, getting to be pretty remote,
colonial Williamsburg notwithstanding. So I will stipulate that a good
claim can be made for each of these dates as a reference point for cultur-
al change that assertedly influences our constitutional civic discourse, and
thus I will look at each of these dates as my arguments develop.
To itemize every point of cultural difference between 1787 and today
would restate much that generally is recognized and would induce bore-
dom. Rather, I propose to focus on only those aspects of cultural change
that have had an especially significant effect in producing the current ver-
sion of American society and which are similarly responsible for
alterations in the nature of our civic discourse.
A. From the Printed Word to the Graphic Image
In 1787 the culture was indisputably steeped in the printed word.
According to the historian Alan Brinkley, "well over half of all white men"
in colonial America were literate, "a rate substantially higher than in most
European countries."2 In New England there was "nearly universal male
literacy toward the end of the colonial period." 3 Despite limited educa-
tional opportunities for women, "the literacy rate for females was also
substantially higher than that of their European counterparts," 4 but may
not have exceeded 50% except in isolated pockets of sophistication, such
as Boston, where female literacy was probably about 65 to 70% by the
1760's.1 Thus, while literacy was much lower among women and nearly
nonexistent among slaves, that has more to do with the limited 18th cen-
tury conception of political and commercial society than it has to do with
rejection of a culture of the printed word. To understand how thorough-
ly the culture of 1787 was formed by typography, one must move
backward more than 300 years to contemplate briefly the revolution
wrought by Johannes Gutenberg.
The creation of moveable type and the production of books in ver-
nacular languages dramatically altered European culture from an oral
culture governed by a literate clerisy of clergy and nobility to one in which
knowledge became readily accessible to almost everyone equipped with
literacy. While this did not happen instantly, by the time of European set-
dement in America, the culture of the printed word was well-established,
and Americans during the colonial era were particularly avid consumers
of books.6 As Neil Postman has described, the technology of the printed
word necessarily produced certain habits of the mind - sustained
engagement with ideas, critical evaluation of those ideas, cultivation of
abstract thought - that percolated through the culture as a way of appre-
hending the world in which Americans then lived. This should not be
surprising, for "changes in communication technology invariably.., alter
the structure of interests (the things thought about), the character of sym-
bols (the things thought with), and the nature of community (the area in
which thoughts develop)." 7 Before the printed word, communication was
necessarily social. But books are best read in silence; the conversation is
between the absent author and the present reader. Human sociability and
reading are incompatible, at least at the same moment in time. This phe-
nomenon of changed technology produced conditions in which
individuality could flourish, since widespread acceptance of the highly
individual pursuit of reading inevitably led to greater acceptance of the
claims of individuality in other spheres of human life. I do not claim, of
course, that the individualism of the Enlightenment was caused by
Gutenberg; I assert only that the technology of the printed word created
the possibility that Enlightenment thinkers would reconstruct the world
on a basis that gave primacy to the individual. Without conscious design,
the technology of the printed word altered the structure of interests -
the things people thought about.
But the printed word did more; it also changed the tools of thought,
what Innis calls the the character of symbols. Books require organization,
not only sentence by sentence and paragraph by paragraph, but in larger
coherent blocks - sections, chapters, books-within-books. This organi-
zation is not haphazard or whimsical - or at least it was not until the
stream-of-consciousness novelists of the 20th century appeared, an event
which, as will be apparent later on, was entirely predictable. The printed
word is primarily a sequential form of communication, stressing logical
relationships and ideas that build as inexorably as a sequence of whole
numbers from one to 100. Of course, many books fall short of the rigor-
ous complete demands of sequentiality, logic, and clarity, but the point is
that the book changed the way people thought about any given subject.
Before typography, a legal scholar would find it difficult to demonstrate
the relationship of any discrete point of law to a logic of the law as a whole
because almost nobody possessed enough manuscript books to describe
the whole body of law. But with the advent of the printing press, and the
consequent increase in the amount of information that a single volume
could contain, a reorganized Corpus Juris was soon prepared - one that
divided its parts into coherent subjects, included cross-references, alpha-
betized indexes, and implemented a consistent, intelligible style.8 In
reorganizing the body of thought to be accessible in the printed format,
the editors of Corpus Juris essentially created a new subject. It was not
new, of course, but its presentation and absorption through the technol-
ogy of the printed word amounted to a reinvention.
This process was repeated in nearly every field of human thought. In
religion,9 the widespread dissemination of Bibles in vernacular tongues
made God accessible to every literate person. The priestly intermediary
was no longer necessary, and the Reformation was a predictable result.
Even the Bible itself changed by the creation of new vernacular transla-
tions, such as the King James version of 1611, that became the word of
God to English speaking Christians. In science, typography permitted
ready collection and communication of ideas and data, especially in such
fields as mathematics where the vernacular of the discipline transcends
language barriers.
Thus, in Neil Postman's phrase, was "Literate Man" created." By
1787, the culture of Literate Man was so entrenched that, at least among
those who counted as polity, there was no other culture. While a written
constitution certainly was possible in an age before typography (Magna
Charta performed, in diluted fashion, a similar role), the intellectual sig-
nificance of a written constitution was impossible to conceive before
typography. Justice James Iredell's famed response to Justice Samuel
Chase in Calder v. Bulk' would likely not have occurred to a man
unshaped by the culture of the printed word. The essence of Iredell's
rejection of unwritten natural law principles as fetters upon government
was his belief that such unwritten principles were subjective, varying with
each person. We may doubt today whether written language is much
more determinate, but we live in an age dominated by the graphic image.
Iredell did not; for him, the printed word was a powerful boundary of
objectivity, of a common ground of meaning. John Marshall expressed a
similar faith in the printed word by grounding the power of judicial
review, in part, on the idea that the act of writing a constitution must be
seen to have legal significance. Judicial review is a necessary inference
from a written constitution, said Marshall, for otherwise "written consti-
tutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in
its own nature illimitable."
The commitment of American constitutional discourse to the culture
of the printed word has, of course, not been limited to these early profes-
sions of faith. The entire official structure of constitutional discourse is
premised on the existence of a culture of print. We interpret our written
constitution through written arguments and oral colloquy based upon
those arguments and a written record of prior proceedings. The interpre-
tive judgment is announced in written opinions that seek to explain the
rational, logical basis for the result. Even the substance of the written con-
stitution displays at times a bias for the culture of print. The First
Amendment, for example, in guaranteeing freedom of speech, religion,
press, assembly, and petition, expresses "the fundamental values of the lit-
erate, reasoning mind as fostered by the print revolution: a belief in
privacy, individuality, intellectual freedom, open criticism, and commu-
nity action."13
Unofficial constitutional discourse has been grounded similarly in
print culture. Not only do academics debate the appropriate meaning of
the Constitution by marshaling their arguments in texts, the wider "lay'
community uses the structure of logic to frame their contentions about
constitutional meaning, whether in letters to the editor or in conversations
over the lunch table. Indeed, it is hard to imagine constitutional discourse
apart from a culture of print. But it is not impossible to do so, and in the
next section I shall attempt to describe that emerging discourse.
What has been said thus far about the ubiquity of print culture in
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1787 is equally true of 1868. Indeed, if anything, the culture of print was
even more widespread than in 1787. Literacy rates were higher, elementary
education was more available, and the diffusion of information by printed
word was more abundant than in 1787. It is thus ironic to note that by
1868 the seeds of transformation of print culture into graphic culture
already had been sown. The agents were Louis Daguerre, who by perfect-
ing the invention of Joseph Niepce brought forth the daguerreotype, and
Samuel EB. Morse, who perhaps communicated more than he realized
when he tapped out "What hath God wrought?" on the first telegraph.
The photograph, of course, permitted the permanent capture of a dis-
crete moment. When one looks at a Matthew Brady photograph of Civil
War dead, young men with lives to be lived but framed forever as bodies
stiffened and bloated against their constraining clothing, there is an eerie
and poignant quality that makes an emotional statement far more pow-
erful than any printed saga devoted to the cruelty of warfare. It is not so
much that a picture is worth a thousand words as it is that a picture
replaces all the words there are. By itself, the photograph was treated as a
supplement to the culture of print, an added facet to aid the assimilation
of information presented by typography. For an entire culture of graphic
communication to arise another technological advance was needed - the
telegraph.
The link between telegraphy and photography was not immediately
obvious. The telegraph destroyed the informational boundaries of print-
based culture. Before the telegraph, information moved only as fast as the
human, aided by mechanical transport, could move. In Morse's time that
speed might have been perhaps 35 miles per hour, the speed of a train
hurrying along a level, well-maintained track in antebellum America. But
the telegraph moved information at the speed of light, thus permitting a
person in California to know instantly what might be occurring at the
same moment in New York. Of course, an infrastructure was required to
be developed for Californians and New Yorkers to share the immediate
details of their respective lives, and that infrastructure was not long in
coming. Telegraphed news, however, is remote and of no immediate rel-
evance to one's localized existence. To know instantly that thousands have
died in a Turkish earthquake, or that hundreds are being slaughtered by
genocidal violence in some remote quarter of the globe, may move a per-
son to tears, or rage, or compassion, but it is far more likely to produce a
simple numb awareness. Postman has argued, in his classic work Amusing
Ourselves to Death, that the effect of this cornucopia of instant informa-
tion unrelated to our localized existence, especially when delivered by
television programming, is to reduce everything to entertainment.
Allowing for the intervening technological discovery of airwave broad-
casting, it was the union of the telegraph - the ability to transmit
information instantaneously - with the photographic image that
launched the graphic culture. I leave the full implications of that culture
to civic discourse for the next section, but for now we need only see that
the barest beginnings of graphic culture were in evidence in 1868.
By 1937 the culture produced by typography was under assault, but
the assault was not very evident. The movement of instantaneous infor-
mation, by radio and telegraph, was fully developed. Americans knew as
much as they wished to know, perhaps more, about the Spanish Civil
War, Japanese atrocities in China, or college football scores. Franklin
Roosevelt could, and did, appeal directly to the people through the imme-
diate oral medium of radio. Never before had a President spoken directly
to the people in their homes, even if his voice had only the corporeal pres-
ence of the radio receiver. The power of imagery alone as a
communicative medium was symbolized by the first issue of Life maga-
zine. Indeed, reflect a moment on the power of imagery by recalling, as I
have just done above, the Spanish Civil War and the Japanese atrocities in
China. In my mind, and perhaps in yours, those phrases immediately
conjure two specific images: Robert Capa's haunting photo of a Spanish
loyalist soldier, arms flung wide and clutching his rifle, at the moment the
fatal bullet has caught him, and the photo of a naked, wailing baby sit-
ting alone on a railway track in Nanking, as the city burns in the
background. But these images were photographs, images over which the
mind could linger and could ponder, affording time for reflection, assess-
ment, and recurring engagement. Television's union of instant
communication and graphic imagery, a marriage that produced an
unceasing Niagara of ephemeral imagery, was still a decade or more away,
and the dramatic cultural alterations induced by television were a gener-
ation or two further into the future. So the culture of 1937 was still a
culture of print, albeit one that was far less monolithic than the cultures
of 1868 or 1787.
In such a culture civic discourse necessarily was carried on in the
mode shaped by the technology of typography, a technology that
required organization of thoughts into a coherent whole, a presentation
that was sequential in some logical way, and an opportunity to reflect
upon and respond (inwardly or outwardly) to the argument thus made.
We should not be surprised that our ancestors of the mid-19th century
were willing to sacrifice large chunks of time and considerable comfort
to hear such men as Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas debate, for
hours and hours, public questions, in a fashion that placed reasoned
argument at a premium. Nor should we be surprised that the United
States Supreme Court devoted days, not minutes, to oral argument of
constitutional questions and that printed copies of those arguments and
the opinions that resulted were a commercially viable publication in the
lay community. In short, the culture of America from its European col-
onization to roughly the end of the Second World War was a culture of
print, a culture in which the habits of mind induced by the technology
of typography were pervasive, dominant, and critical to shaping
public discourse.
B. From Popular Culture to Mass Culture
The term "popular culture" often is treated as synonymous with
"mass culture," but as I am using the terms they mean distinctly different
things. Popular culture is the practices, the customs, the social habits, and
the entertainment that are created by individuals, acting together or alone.
Popular culture is the aggregation of these acts of creation by the partici-
pants, the residue of participatory invention. Mass culture is the practices,
the customs, the social habits, and the entertainment that are consumed by
individuals. Mass culture is a product created by discrete specialists with-
in the society, to be purveyed as any other consumer good. This is seen
most clearly in entertainment. In 1787 entertainment might have been
reading, a game of cards or quoits, or music created by musicians in a
home or a community hall, a diversion created by the participants. In
2000 it is far more apt to be Nintendo, MTV, a video, a movie, a televi-
sion program, or a mass spectacle such as auto racing or professional field
sports, all products created by businesspeople for mass consumption. But
mass culture is not limited to entertainment. Social habits in 1787 were
inculcated by parents and one's immediate social group, producing a sense
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of behavioral propriety that was endogenous to the actual community of
real people with whom one interacted. Social habits in 1999 are inculcat-
ed as much by the manufactured world of mass culture - primarily
television and movies - as they are by the real people with whom one
interacts. Indeed, the interaction with real people that a youngster in
America experiences in the embers of the twentieth century is likely to
reinforce the messages about appropriate behavior that are delivered as
part of mass culture. The old method of acculturation has been co-opted
into the service of mass culture.
The world of popular culture existed in harmony, albeit a sometimes
uneasy harmony, with what I shall call "high culture." High culture cen-
tered on refinements of language, art, and customs, appreciation of
cultural context through understanding of the panoply of world history,
and acquisition of a sense of obligation to one's culture to perpetuate its
best aspects. That definition of high culture may strike you as terribly
quaint, antiquarian, nostalgic, romantic, and hopelessly rooted in elitist
sensitivities. Even the idea of "high" culture is suspect today. To twist a
phrase indelibly belonging to George Trow, today's world is the culture of
no context. 4 Mass culture - "a glib, soulless, pop culture""5 - has over-
whelmed both popular culture and high culture. More precisely, mass
culture has marginalized all other forms of culture. High culture and pop-
ular culture are populated by oddballs, though different types of oddballs.
High culture attracts those few remaining people with a keen appreciation
of the timeless, "the desire to be connected to the life that has gone before,
to stand in the ancient places, to hear the undying stories.' 6 Popular cul-
ture is reduced to subcults - whether the pathetic spectacle of folk music
wholly divorced from its vital source, Jane Austen enthusiasts, Civil War
re-enactors, motorcyclists gathering to revel in the roar of the open road,
or windsurfers skimming along in the wind tunnel of the Columbia River
Gorge. Neither high nor popular culture is extinct, but both exist in the
shadow of an elephantine mass culture. The result is to transform culture
from an unplanned aggregation of individual acts of inventive genius to
simply one more skillfully packaged and marketed consumer product.
And in an age of increasing consolidation of commercial enterprise, to say
nothing of the obliteration of geography accomplished by internet com-
merce, the available cultural products are not only uniformly part of mass
culture, but the range of choice diminishes within that bleak context. You
can have Coke or Pepsi, the Back Street Boys or Britney Spears, ama-
zon.com or barnesandnoble.com.
This cultural alteration has an effect on civic discourse. Most impor-
tantly, the transformation from popular culture to mass culture is
characterized by a shift from activity to passivity. When one's cultural
referents are consumed rather than internally produced, the world begins
to look exogenous. In a world that seems entirely exogenous to the indi-
vidual people who compose it, the incentive - even the desire - to
exercise one's voice eventually will wane and will disappear. Civic dis-
course is premised on the belief that what one says, thinks, and believes
matters to a world outside our corporeal membrane of skin. When that
belief is undermined to the point of collapse, there is no reason for civic
discourse. Instead, conditioned by the passivity of consumption in vir-
tually every aspect of life, civic "discourse" becomes but another item of
consumption. There is little need to ponder - much less to debate -
the implications of foreign monetary contributions to American politi-
cal parties since that topic is boring, like a generic six-pack of "Beer." But
the tawdry and specific details of the President's sexual dalliance in vari-
ous small rooms adjacent to the Oval Office are a fascinating diversion
- a spectacle amusing, nauseating, or irrelevant - depending on the
taste of the consumer. It is not generic "Beer"; it is microbrewed ale or
pilsner, but it is still a consumer product. The shift in perception - and
consequent diminution - of the relevance of civic discourse can be
glimpsed by comparing two modest cultural artifacts, separated by only
30 or 40 years. In the 1950's and the early 1960's, Mad magazine's fic-
tional spokesman of satire, Alfred E. Neuman, declared, "What? Me
worry?" But it was no longer satirical when in the 1980's and the 1990's,
the refrain "don't worry, be happy" floated through the American ver-
nacular. Transposed to civic discourse, the mantra of our times might be
"don't think, be entertained."
The displacement of high culture by mass culture has produced
another effect on civic discourse. High culture was an aspirational culture.
It was not easily entered. To appreciate high culture required not just lit-
eracy, but a contextual understanding of the evolution of human
experience in art, drama, literature, music, and poetry. One could not
simply consume high culture; it was necessary to engage it, to reflect upon
it, to question it, to debate it - even if only internally - in order to
understand it. But all that is necessary to enter mass culture is a credit
card. Perhaps a modem would help, too, but that ubiquitous communi-
cator is not yet indispensable for entrance to mass culture. No thought is
needed, save perhaps the thought involved in choosing channels. Mass
culture is a mammoth flatland, to borrow Ken Wilber's phrase, 7 a place
of no texture, tinted in shades of grey, devoid of the motley, unruly, life-
giving impulses of human spirit. In such a flatland, conditioned to even,
bland experience, why should one bother to formulate an independent
thought, much less to speak it? Does anyone go to a dinner party any
longer and engage in a polite, yet vigorous, argument across the table
about the implications of NATO intervention in Kosovo, or the wisdom
of affirmative action? It might be acceptable to argue the relative merits
of Jaguar and Mercedes, or Netscape and Explorer, but surely not politics.
Such behavior is uncouth, almost rude, and certainly not likely to earn a
return invitation to a social circle where pleasantries are most highly
prized, which is to say the social circle that composes America on the cusp
of a new century.
The omnipotence of mass culture, with its focus on passive con-
sumption of ready-made cultural products, has led to the predictable
result that opinions, like fashions, are just another consumer item.
Opinions are packaged and are sold to a consuming public, using all the
familiar arts of mass culture vendors. A catchy phrase, the perfect sound
bite, is a far better device to sell ready-made opinions than a tedious
excursion into an issue, a debate with self and others over the evidence
bearing upon the point. And why not? It works. "Where's the beef?." asked
Walter Mondale, and Gary Hart was doomed. "If the evidence doesn't fit,
you must acquit," chanted Johnny Cochran, with the memory of the
blood-shrunken glove still fresh, and the jury did just that. "They're com-
ing for the old folks; they want to starve the children," shouted
Democrats in 1995, and this apocalyptic hyperbole was purchased in the
bazaar of mass culture. "It's morning in America," declared a jaunty
Ronald Reagan, even as the national debt tripled; but the opinion was a
best seller. Are we a nation of fools? Perhaps, but it is both more charita-
ble and more accurate to say that we are a nation of consumers and that
everything may be found in the gigantic superstore of mass culture.
Mass culture "has taken on a life of its own, without reference to the
people it is supposed to protect."" Popular culture provided a participa-
tory web that united people in a social understanding. George Trow has
likened it to the safety net under the circus high-wire. Filled with youth-
fil Icarus-like ambition, we fall from the wire into the net knotted by
myriad acts of voluntary participation that create a sustaining culture. We
regroup and find more realistic adult vocations. But mass culture is no
net; it is more akin to a suction tube. Mass culture does not sustain us; it
drains us and leaves us with no sense of social relationships. Trow charac-
terizes mass culture as "the sum total of whatever it is we happened to
have liked. And if this year we like Debbie Reynolds and Tammy and the
Bachelor, and last year we didn't, and the year before we liked Nine Inch
Nails, and tomorrow we decide to take a look at the Butthole Surfers,
well, that's just what we happen to want at the moment, and why should-
n't we?"'" In such a culture is there any reason to formulate and to voice
our own independent, reasoned opinions? That is an act of social partic-
ipation, a knitting of another strand in the web. Where do you place the
knitting needles of civic discourse when there is no web to mend?
C. From Real Experience to Faux Experience
For most of human history there was no such thing as "false" experi-
ence; any experience was real. The possibility of faux experience was
created by television - the transmission of graphic imagery through
space and with indifference to time. For the first time people could "expe-
rience" events from afar. Natural catastrophes in Asia, sporting events in
Florida, political candidates speaking in Iowa, sea mammals cavorting off
the Patagonian coast - all these and more can be viewed on the familiar
screen in New York or San Francisco or Tokyo. But, as Jerry Mander
pointed out over 20 years ago,20 this "was only the experience of sitting in
a darkened room, staring at flickering light, ingesting images which had
been edited, cut, rearranged, sped up, slowed down, and confined in hun-
dreds of ways." 21 To witness the televised image of a colossal tsunami
slamming into the Pacific coast of California is assuredly not the same
experience as standing on the beach when the tsunami strikes, and I will
prefer the faux experience, if given the choice. But at least I will know that
the experience is false, that what I experience is watching a glowing image
on the face of a communications appliance. Assuming that all viewers of
television are equally aware of the true nature of the television experience,
why should we have any concern about this faux experience, or think it
has any effect on civic discourse?
First, protracted exposure to faux experience is apt to distort a per-
son's sense of the boundaries between the real and the contrived. A study
of television viewers conducted in the mid-1970's showed that those who
watched a great deal of television "were more likely to overestimate the
percentage of the world population that lives in America;... the percent-
age of the population who have professional jobs;... the number of police
in the U.S. and the amount of violence. In all these cases, the overestimate
matched a distortion that exists in television programming. The more
television people watched, the more their view of the world matched tele-
vision reality."22 This should not be surprising. Television viewing
displaces alternative activities, and if one watches enough television, it is
as if the viewer lives a hermetic existence connected to the larger world
only by television. Faux experience is substituted for real experience, and
the viewer's judgments concerning the real world become informed pri-
marily by the data he ingests through his faux experience (which,
ironically, becomes the viewer's real experience). The contribution of such
a person to civic discourse is likely to be negative, since their experiences
are not real. Of course, if the entire society prefers faux to real experience,
then civic discourse is but another by-product of the faux society. Faux
discourse becomes real discourse in a society that has elevated the false to
the real.
Television is by no means the only device by which experience can be
rendered false. The desire to substitute the virtual for the authentic is the
appeal of the monstrosity called Las Vegas. Beneath a withering sun on an
alkali desert in Nevada one encounters - New York! Paris! The Eiffel
Tower! Venice! The Doge's Palace! The Bridge of Sighs! Egypt! The
Sphinx! Of course, the visitor knows this is faux Paris, faux Venice, since
it is possible at any moment to gamble with the Nevada croupiers. But
these monuments of total fakery would not be built, at great expense, if
the shrewd businessmen who constructed them did not think that the
phony is attractive. And why shouldn't these bogus landmarks be attrac-
tive to a people conditioned, at best, to oscillate comfortably between the
false and the real and, at worst, to prefer the fake to the genuine?
Hunter Thompson was perhaps more correct than he knew when he
portrayed Las Vegas in 1971 as a reality that made drugs unnecessary.
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The enduring popularity of drugs - whether alcohol, tobacco, opiates,
marijuana, or any of the smorgasbord of substances that pervade the
nation - might have something to do with the preference for virtual exis-
tence to real existence. Drugs are a reality, of course, and the reality that
is occasioned by their abuse is among the cruelest realities of all, yet mil-
lions of us prefer the risks of that reality in order to sample the false reality
of a chemical euphoria. Nobody thinks a drunk can engage in civic dis-
course, but a nation of metaphorical drunks will still have a civic
discourse of sorts.
There is, however, a more subtle and far more pervasive way in which
virtual experience is substituted for the real item. Neil Postman has chart-
ed the evolution of technological innovation from simple tools to
technocracy to technopoly.24 By technocracy, Postman meant "a separa-
tion of moral and intellectual values"" in which "people came to believe
that knowledge is power, that humanity is capable of progressing, that
poverty is a great evil, and that the life of the average person is as mean-
ingful as any other."26 Postman's thesis is that in technocracy, which
occupied the 19th and most of the 20th centuries in America, permitted
"two opposing world-views 
- the technological and the traditional -
[to coexist] in uneasy tension,"27 but that "[w]ith the rise of Technopoly,
one of those thought-worlds disappears."2 1 What Postman calls technop-
oly "is a state of culture [and] a state of mind" in which "the culture seeks
its authorization in technology, finds its satisfactions in technology, and
takes its orders from technology," thus requiring "the development of a
new kind of social order" characterized by the beliefs "that technical
progress is humanity's supreme achievement and the instrument by which
our most profound dilemmas may be solved," and that "information is an
unmixed blessing, which through its continued and uncontrolled pro-
duction and dissemination, offers increased freedom, creativity, and peace
of mind."'29
Postman posits that information needs to be filtered through social
institutions in order to be coherent. Institutions perform this role "prin-
cipally by directing how much weight and... value one must give to
information" and are thus "concerned with the meaning of information. "30
The paradigmatic example of this institutional filtering is the law of evi-
dence, but other examples are schools, the family, and religious
institutions. But such filtering is no longer possible in the present age of
information glut, even though various bureaucratic institutions continue
to attempt to control this uncontrolled cataract of information. Instead,
the flood of information is celebrated, on the assumption that more is
better. This assumption is characteristic of technopoly, since its guiding
principle is faith in the goodness, indeed, necessity, of technological
advance. If technology can make available more information, it must be
good, even if much of the information available is junk. There is only so
much time; is it an unreserved good to use it to monitor the auction mar-
ket in Beanie Babies or to engage in day trading of securities?
More important, however, is the ideology of technology. Make no
mistake, technology is not ideologically neutral. Just as Gutenberg's
moveable type had imbedded within it the ideological seeds of print cul-
ture, making possible the Reformation, the Renaissance, and the
Enlightenment, the instantaneous availability of graphic imagery via tele-
vision and internet, and the reformulation of print through the internet
carries with it an ideological bias. The bias of graphic culture is most obvi-
ous. Its emphasis on the incessant restless movement of imagery may not
be the sole cause of that modern plague, "attention deficit disorder," but
it is surely a major contributor. Is it reasonable to expect a child fed from
infancy a diet of rapid-fire imagery, none of which engages cognitive
processes, but all of which taps into the emotive graphic memory, to be
calm and focused? In a culture in which every child has access to televi-
sion, and television is nothing more than a ceaseless cavalcade of frenetic
hyperactivity that imprints itself on the raw, freshly developing cognitive
pathways of the brain, the wonder is that "ADD" is considered abnormal.
Graphic culture - hot, emotive, crackling with constant change - is a
frontal assault on the patient habits of thought that are instilled by print
culture. Print culture, by and large, has capitulated. USA Today is the
McPaper of graphic culture. Chock full of bar charts peddling irrelevant
tidbits about "us," its articles are as superficial as television news. The
motto of graphic culture, with respect to information about any issue, is
pretty much the same as the Brylcreem hair cream jingle from the 1950's:
"A little dab'll do ya." This is not inconsistent with the information glut
that technology has spawned, since much of that information is wholly
superficial and, given the glut, there is insufficient time and resources
available to sift the useless from the informative, with the result that the
useless often is endowed with significance it ought not command.
Consider public opinion polling, for example. It is a well recognized fact
that the Clinton administration uses poll results to drive policy judg-
ments, and it is not likely to be alone in doing so. But polls only provide
answers to what is asked, and the way the question is asked is critical. Neil
Postman tells the story of two priests to illustrate the principle. One priest
asks the Pope whether it is permissible to smoke while praying and is told
"no," prayer should be his total focus; the second priest asks whether it is
permissible to pray while smoking and is told "yes," prayer is always
appropriate.31 In our time we know that poll results are likely to show
most people opposed to elimination of race-conscious "affirmative action"
and in favor of elimination of race-conscious "preferences," even though
the two proposals are identical. Polling data is used to beam back at the
people the apparent sentiments they prefer. This is high graphic culture.
If the Nielsen ratings suggest "we" like "The Simpsons," we'll get a lot
more cartoons about dysfunctional families. And we have.
But such is the pace of cultural evolution that graphic culture, which
assumed preeminence in the last half of the 20th century, already has a
competitor - the hybrid of graphics and print that is the internet. And it
is here that the substitution of faux for real experience, bad enough in
graphic culture, is even more insidious. Unlike television, where the sub-
stitution is fairly obvious, the substitution worked by the internet is far
more subtle; it is the displacement of personal contact by a technological-
ly synthesized version of human contact. Consider the following example.
It is now commonplace to lament the end of the independent book-
store, a casualty of a pincer movement by the chain bookstores and the
internet vendors. The cultural importance of the independent bookstore
was that it acted as a node for the exchange of cultural information. In
addition to all other sources of information about new and interesting
books, a print-age person could enter his favorite bookstore and either
browse among an elegant selection of thought or ask a known and trust-
ed friend - the bookseller - to recommend something. The result was
often something unexpected and frequently exciting. This human inter-
action produced what Carl Jung called "synchronicity" - the union of
apparently unrelated phenomena in a meaningful way. But this is not lost
with the passing of the independent bookseller, assert technology enthu-
siasts. In a recent New Yorker article, technologist Malcom Gladwell touts
"collaborative filtering" as a replacement.32 Collaborative filtering, it turns
out, is simply the process by which a computer user enters his preferences
with respect to books, or movies, or whatever the desired subject might
be, and the software inspects a large data base of other people's preferences
and finds preferences that dovetail with the user's but which also include
other items that might be of interest to the user. If I tell the computer that
I like Memoirs of a Geisha, Snow Falling on Cedars, The Voyage of the
Narwhal, and Cold Mountain, but I do not much care for Amsterdam and
In the Skin of a Lion, supposedly the computer will canvass other people's
preferences and tell me that I also will like All the Pretty Horses, Bucking
the Sun, and The Lunenburg Variation, but that I will not care for The Eye
in the Door. The computer software may indeed do this if my preferences
are adequately and fully expressed, the data base of other people's prefer-
ences is large enough, and the software works properly. But the experience
is sterilized of any possibility for synchronicity - the magic of a connec-
tion that transcends the binary logic and linearity of the machine and
relies, instead, on some intuitive leap across the gap of human minds.
This is faux experience of an even deadlier sort, for it substitutes one
dimension of human experience - lineal, logical thought, however mag-
nified - for the multiplicity of human experience that we actually have
in our personal encounters. Irony abounds in this, for the print age ush-
ered in an ascendancy of logical thought, the graphic age destroyed logic,
and the emerging graphic-cum-print age threatens to turn the principal
tool of print culture into an autocratic monopolist.
Nor is this phenomenon limited to the example I have provided. If
one aspect of technopoly is, as Postman claims, to remove all barriers to
access to information, especially barriers rooted in social institutions, the
internet has simultaneously aided that removal and added new barriers of
its own. The available information is so vast that it is necessary to use a
search engine of some sort to find, to sort, and to discard information. If
the result of your search is something like 428,233 sites that match your
query, you do not have useful information. If you refine the query so pre-
cisely that you have eleven matching sites, you have useful information,
but you have confined yourself by your own imagination, when what you
sought to do was to expand your imagination. If, instead, you rely on the
search engine's categorical approach, you limit yourself to the information
made available to you by a new social institution; in effect, you have sub-
stituted Yahoo for the World Book Encyclopedia. And all of this involves
substituting the lineal, disembodied connection of the binary language of
computers for the more subtle, nuanced, mysteriously synchronistic lan-
guage of human personal interaction.
II. The Altered Nature of Civic Discourse
In order to understand the altered nature of civic discourse, it is nec-
essary to pause for a moment and to summarize the culture that has been
produced by the maturation of graphic culture and its imminent meta-
morphosis into a marriage of the frenetic emotionalism of graphic culture
and the arid coldness of binary logic. I shall let others speak for me.
In deploring Edmund Morris's use of his alter ego as a fictional nar-
rator of Ronald Reagan's life, Michiko Kakutani, the capable book
reviewer of the New York Times, declared recently that Morris's failing was
partly due to "the tenor of the times: the erasure of the lines between
opinion and fact, the tabloidization of the cultural zeitgest and the rela-
tivistic approach to truth fostered by identity politics." 3 Television, the
omnipresent missionary of graphic culture, bears a large responsibility for
"erasure of the lines between opinion and fact." It is the nature of televi-
sion to demand constant movement of imagery, to eliminate any
possibility of reflection and consideration as we jump to the next image.
Earthquake in Turkey. Mangled buildings. A bombing in Israel. Mangled
bodies. Buy Pepsi. It's the real thing. The President speaks. Bad
Republicans. Nike. Just do it. The Mets lost again. There goes the pen-
nant. Fall into The Gap. Floyd has gone, but North Carolina is under
water. Gert is stewing near Bermuda. Relax in your BMW. Is it any won-
der that opinion and fact have dissolved into a flaccid goo at the bottom
of the laboratory beaker called America? And the imagery is all entertain-
ment, despite what the flacks of television will say. The mangled bodies
in Turkey and Israel are of no personal concern to the viewer; in the guise
of news what instead is conveyed is a ghoulish form of entertainment -
a practice reinforced by television's habit of trivializing tragedy by inter-
spersing commercial pitches and sports scores amongst the human
disasters of the day, to say nothing of the crass practice of showing a brief
image of sheet-shrouded bodies, coupled with the voice-over "murder in
Oakland; details at 11." The print tabloids pioneered coverage of the sen-
sational and the lurid, because they knew it would entertain and thus sell.
A recent book, New York Noir: Crime Photos from the Daily News
Archive," illustrates the point. From a blurry photo of the execution at
Sing Sing in 1928 of Ruth Snyder to a crisp photographic capture of
bloody corpses, bewitching suspects, and tough-guy prosecutors, the
Daily News traded in tragedy as entertainment. Is it any wonder that as
graphic culture assumed preeminence, the tabloid approach to print
would become the dominant trope of the graphic age? The camera is no
respecter of boundaries, whether of privacy, moral decency, or human dig-
nity. It records the reflected light that streams through its briefly opened
lens - indifferent to the use, the effect, or the contextual significance of
the images that result. This ability to erase mental, social, or ethical
boundaries, when coupled with the product-driven ethos of mass culture,
has produced a progressive lessening of the boundaries to civic discourse
that once were present in the more reflective culture of print. The con-
temporary propensity to probe every aspect of the life of public citizens is
the predictable result. Does Bill Clinton prefer jockey or boxer shorts?
Did George W Bush snort cocaine 25 years ago? Did Gary Hart have sex
with a woman not his wife aboard Monkey Business? Does Gary Bauer
have a mistress? Finally, in a world without reference points, is it surpris-
ing that notions of truth should descend into nothing more than ignorant
individual viewpoints? In a culture that sneers at the very idea of truth and
belittles it as the creed of slow-thinkers who have yet to get up to speed
with Derrida or whoever is at the cutting edge of the deconstructionist
nonsense of today, any crackpot idea will suffice as "truth." A civic dis-
course of tribal identity makes sense in such a culture, or at least it makes
as much sense as a civic discourse based on phrenology or astrology.
George Trow argued in 1981 that the graphic age is situated in a "con-
text of no context." By this he meant "that television would establish the
context of no context, and then chronicle it."35 Later, Trow illustrated the
occurrence of his prediction by describing a 1997 C-SPAN discussion of
violence on television. "It was all about ratings, how we do this, how we
do that. There was one great gap.... [W]hen the people on this program
talked about context, they talked about the context of the television pro-
gram - nothing about the context of history, nothing about the context
of American social life, nothing that could lend a sense of sequence to
what's happened in this remarkable television avatar. When they talked
about context, they just meant what the producers of the show had cre-
ated in the way of context. 3 6 Of course it would be thus. The guardians
of mass culture know no other context than that they create, and so suc-
cessfully is it accepted in lieu of real experience that it becomes accepted
as real experience. When this is the context of civic discourse, the only
discourse that can occur is a narcissistic, self-referential debate about
meaning within the sterile confines of mass culture. Should we be sur-
prised at the American public's salacious fascination with President
Clinton's uses of cigars, or Monica Lewinskys underwear preferences?
Neil Postman describes American technopoly as "progress without
limits, rights without responsibilities, and technology without cost. The
Technopoly story is without a moral center. It puts in its place efficiency,
interest, and economic advance. It promises heaven on earth through...
technological progress. It casts aside all traditional narratives and symbols
that suggest stability and orderliness, and tells, instead, of a life of skills,
technical expertise, and the ecstasy of consumption.... It answers [Allan]
Bloom by saying that the story of Western civilization is irrelevant; it
answers the political left by saying there is indeed a common culture whose
name is Technopoly and whose key symbol is now the computer, toward
which there must be neither irreverence nor blasphemy. '" 37 Susan Faludi38
argues that the result of these cultural shifts has been to transform a cul-
ture that valued commitment, loyalty, mastery of craft, duty, and, yes, even
honor, into an "ornamental culture," one in which image and celebrity are
the twin gods of the modern commercial Olympus, "a society drained of
context, saturated with a competitive individualism that has been robbed
of craft or utility, and ruled by commercial values that revolve around who
has the most, the best, the biggest, the fastest."" It should not surprise us
that in such a culture, there is altogether too much talk about rights and
entitlements and too little talk about obligations and duties. ° When civic
discourse in such a culture rises above the level of mere entertainment, it
becomes just another self-centered whine. "I want it all, now," could easi-
ly be the national motto, and surely it would be a more appropriate one
than "In God We Trust." Democratic self-governance cannot survive
indefinitely, however, if the sovereign people uniformly adopt "me first" as
their individual and collective credo. Some recognition of the need to curb
one's self-interested behavior to achieve a common good is indispensable
to democracy. When civic discourse becomes a babble of self-promotion
it is neither civic nor much of a discourse.
III. Thoughts About the Future
There is a tradition of sorts that authors of jeremiads are obliged to
offer some prescriptions for positive change. The easy way out would be
to suggest that American culture and the public discourse it has spawned
is irredeemable, but I am not that far descended into the inferno of
despair. I hesitate, however, to offer either prescriptions or predictions.
My prescriptions are harsh and will not be taken. Television will not be
eliminated. The graphic culture is well-entrenched; not very many
Americans are likely to abandon it willingly. And I am no seer. A few years
ago, I participated with Jesse Choper in a panel discussion of the Supreme
Court's then-forthcoming term. In the question and answer period I took
a questioner's invitation to predict the outcome of Romer v. Evans, which
was on the docket for that term. Choper declined, quipping: "He who
lives by the crystal ball must be prepared to eat ground glass." So I nei-
ther will predict nor prescribe.
But I will ruminate a bit about the future. The only redemptive
prospect I see is, ironically, in the internet. Although computers, and the
web of computers that compose the internet, have the pernicious quali-
ties I have discussed, the internet is not the purely graphic medium that
is television. It contains the possibility of exchange of print culture
thoughts - whether through e-mail, on-line discussion groups, web
sites, data bases, or the availability of electronic manuscripts, whether or
not also published in some other format. It may be that the internet rep-
resents a salvation of print culture, albeit a faster-paced and
technologically altered print culture. One of the many problems with the
internet, however, is the mammoth amount of unfiltered information
available. We may know that a racist hate site spews garbage, but there is
no social institution present in the internet that says so. I believe firmly
that technology is ideological, and so I am convinced that the ideology
of the computer, and specifically the internet, is present but probably not
fully revealed to us. Just as the industrial revolution of the late 18th and
19th centuries initially mechanized the production of pre-existing goods
(substituting the power loom, for example, for the hand shuttle) before
the telegraph revolutionized human understanding about the nature of
the world, so the information revolution produced by the computer ini-
tially has mechanized familiar processes (e.g., writing, architectural
drafting, accounting, data storage and retrieval, even teaching), but even-
tually will trigger a revolution in human understanding similar in scope
to telegraphy. The industrial revolution begat graphic culture; the infor-
mation revolution will give birth to a post-graphic culture. Perhaps civic
discourse will revive in that culture; it has little future in the age of mass,
graphic culture.
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